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Establishing a coherent collective identity within the modern urban context
among people who have different ideological, social and religious orienta-
tions, and social and economic backgrounds, is an ongoing struggle within
the Alevi community in Turkey. This study tries to understand how alternative
positions on Alevi identity dynamically construct the boundaries, moral con-
tents and the new shape of Alevi identity in modern urban contexts through use
of various discursive resources. At least two main contending ‘positions’ on
Alevi identity try to institutionalise Alevi identity in modern urban contexts,
which are ‘Ideological Position’ and ‘Religious Position’. Those discourse
positions constitute different visions about the past and the future of the
Alevi community as well as the cultural and the political boundaries of Alevi
identity. More importantly, those positions resonate in ordinary citizens’ life
stories as well as group narratives. This study utilises the analytical frame of
‘positioning theory’ to shed light on the complexities of identity negotiation.
Keywords: Alevi identity; negotiation; positioning theory; Turkey; political
identity; religious identity
Introduction
Alevis, one of the largest communal groups in Turkey,1 are spread throughout
the country. The Alevi issue is one of Turkey’s most complicated and commonly
misunderstood identity-based issues. The Alevi identity traditionally has been a
strong communal group identity2 with cultural boundaries, moral values, rituals
and shared collective emotions. This identity, historically and culturally, has ori-
gins as an esoteric Shiite maddhab3 under Islamic belief system. Alevi identity
has been maintained for centuries through an endogamous social order in rural
contexts (Kehl-Bodrogi 1996, pp. 64–67). Specific rituals and cultural practices
have played important roles in the maintenance of Alevi identity. Alevi identity
has ethnic/madhhabic origins in rural contexts, but it has taken on a multiplicity
of forms during the ongoing process of identity transformation, which is marked
by modernisation and urbanisation.
Alevi identity in Turkey is communal in nature, which is historically,
culturally and politically different from what it means to be Sunni. There is
no madhhab-based data that would reflect the actual population of Alevis in
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Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 577
Turkey today, but estimates of Alevi population in Turkey range from 5 million
to 20 million.4 Islamic mysticism, Twelver Shiite mythology, pre-Islamic Turkish
traditions and rituals, modern currents of thought and ideologies have influenced
Alevi tradition (Dressler 2008). Starting from the 1960s, Alevi identity has sought
to reconstitute itself in urban contexts with its institutions and social networks.
The process of reconstituting Alevi identity and institutions in urban contexts led
to controversies within the Alevi community over the nature and characteristics
of Alevi identity. Some scholars define Alevi identity with its religious origins
and sources, whereas some others with ethnic origins. Contemporary Alevi phe-
nomena have been defined as ‘faith-based collective activism’ (Erdemir 2004), a
‘transnational social movement’ (Elise 2003, S¸ahin 2005, Sökefeld 2008), an ‘eth-
nic identity’ (Andrews and Benninghaus 1989, Okan 2004) and a socio-religious
community (Dressler 2012).
There is an ongoing inner debate within the Alevi community about the mean-
ing and the characteristics of Alevi identity. This debate is intertwined with the
discussion related to the future of Alevi identity as a social and political move-
ment. These differences become more visible in social conversations, debates as
well as people’s interpretations of their own life experiences in their life stories.
The meanings which the different Alevi groups assign to social episodes that they
experienced and collective processes that they have gone through, are very differ-
ent from each other. This tacit competition also has practical implications in terms
of shaping the modes of institutionalisation of Alevi community. A variety of dis-
cursive resources were utilised to corroborate these alternative moral positions on
Alevi identity.
This study tries to understand how alternative positions on Alevi identity
dynamically construct the boundaries, moral contents and the new shape of Alevi
identity through use of discursive resources. More specifically, this study tries to
understand how various discursive resources and institutions are practically and
selectively utilised to constitute alternative visions for the future of Alevi commu-
nity. Two dominant forms of discourses and understandings are more vocal in this
debate; these two are political/ideological5 and religious positions. While the reli-
gious position challenges the majority Sunni understanding of Islam, Ideological
Position (IP) tries to challenge the meta-narrative of Turkish nationalism, which
assumes an ethnically, linguistically and religiously homogenous society in Turkey.
Though they share similar concerns related to assimilation and discrimination
of Alevi community, ideological and religious positions try to orientate different
paths for Alevi social and political mobilisation.
The use of discursive resources by alternative positions is not a descriptive
enterprise, it is rather a practical component of identity negotiation. Alevi activists,
scholars, intellectuals, community and religious leaders are active agents in the
process of identity negotiation. There are taxonomies that try to classify the dif-
ferences within the Alevi community according to institutions and social and
religious positions. A distinctive feature of this study is its efforts to incorporate
personal stories, as well as collective narratives and institutions in a nuanced way
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
sta
nb
ul 
Se
hir
 U
ni]
 at
 05
:23
 09
 M
ay
 20
16
 
578 T. Köse
with the use of positioning analysis. More importantly, the discourse positions that
are presented in this study incorporates the normative and practical aspects of the
identity negotiation process in a dynamic and flexible ways, thus keeping some
space for a limited prospective change.
The contextualisation of Alevi identity negotiation
Starting from the early 1960s, Alevi citizens began migrating to the cities. Because
of the processes of rapid urbanisation and modernisation, the traditional Alevi
identity and social order are transforming. Today, the majority of the Alevi popu-
lation live in cities and are organizing around new forms of institutions. This has
had a tremendous impact on the meaning and implications of Alevi identity. The
main challenge for Alevi identity politics is to create the conditions for the main-
tenance of Alevi identity in the modern urban context and to become recognised
and accepted as equal actors by the Turkish state as well as by the other social and
political actors and groups in Turkey.
Within this new social and political landscape, the ambiguous nature and char-
acter of Alevi identity has created significant confusion for the new generation of
urban Alevis. Whether their identity is an ethnic, sectarian, religious or political
identity is a matter of debate within the Alevi community. Different Alevi groups
prefer to define themselves in different terms ranging from ‘a sectarian group’,
‘an ethnic group’, ‘true humanists’, to ‘enlightened Muslims’ or ‘true Muslims’.
This ambiguous debate on the ‘definition’, normative content, boundaries and the
preferred future of Alevi identity and community competition, affects both the
self-definition and modes of the social and political organisation and institutional-
isation of Alevi citizens. Individuals and Alevi opinion-makers resort to the rich,
cultural and narrative repertoires of the Alevi tradition and contemporary social
and political discourses to justify their positions.
Parallel to the Kurdish and Islamist identity movements that resisted the
homogenizing notion of the Republican identity-building project, the Alevis also
initiated uncoordinated efforts to reinvigorate Alevi identity in modern contexts.
However, those earlier efforts were on the periphery of the wide-scale ideologi-
cal struggle (Massicard 2003). Although an earlier Alevi movement was initiated
during the 1960s, many Alevis in urban contexts were more active in left-wing
political activism until the early 1980s. During the 1970s, Alevis were victims
of right-wing ideological violence in Malatya (1978), Maras¸ (1978) and Çorum
(1980).
The 12th September 1980 coup curtailed ideological activism, and the fall of
the Berlin Wall further restricted the ideological struggle. The 1980 military coup
sought to establish a revised version of Kemalism compatible with the ideology of
Turkish–Islamic Synthesis6 (Toprak 2005). Sunni Islam and Turkish nationalism
were incorporated into Kemalism. Ethnic, sectarian and ideological diversity of
Turkish society was completely denied during this era. Alevi citizens felt the threat
of assimilation from the ideological preferences of the social and political order.
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Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 579
These transformations paved the way for Alevi identity politics. European Alevis’
contributions were crucial for the emergence and the institutionalisation of the
Alevi identity movement in Turkey in the early 1990s. Alevi identity has taken
its own shape among Turkish immigrants in Europe, but identity movements in
Turkey and in Europe affected each other. Many analysts strongly argued that it
would not be possible to understand the development of the Alevi movement with-
out emphasizing its transnational dimension, meaning the European dimension
(Sökefeld 2002, 2003, 2008, Massicard 2003, Rigoni 2003, S¸ahin 2005, Özyürek
2009).
With the Sivas Massacre (1993) and Gazi Riots (1995), Alevi citizens expe-
rienced direct violence. Thirty-seven citizens, most of whom were Alevi artists,
writers and musicians who had travelled to Sivas to commemorate the sixteenth-
century Alevi poet and rebel Pir Sultan Abdal, died on 2 July when the Madımak
hotel was set on fire by a fundamentalist Sunni mob. Security forces failed to inter-
vene in time to prevent the catastrophe. The second important shock for the Alevis
was what happened in the Gazi neighbourhood of Istanbul on 13–15 March 1995.
Gazi is a working-class neighbourhood, the residents of which are predominantly
Alevi, and mostly Kurdish–Alevi citizens. On 12 March 1995, three unknown
assailants executed a drive-by shooting at the Dog˘u Coffeehouse, three other cof-
feehouses and a pastry shop. Crowds gathered around the police station to protest
the events. The police responded by shooting at them. Riots spread through-
out the neighbourhood and the rioters destroyed the shops and the workshops
owned by right-wing people (van Bruinessen 1996, p. 9). Those two events cre-
ated widespread trauma and frustration among the Alevi communities in Turkey
and even in Europe (Yildiz and Verkuyten 2011). They acted as catalysts for Alevi
identity politics and Alevi institutionalisation in the post-1980 context.
The academic and popular literatures on Alevilik (Aleviness)7 often refer to the
period starting from the late 1980s as the ‘Alevi revival’ (Kehl-Bodrogi 1996, van
Bruinessen 1996, Çamurog˘lu 1997, Vorhoff 1998, 2003, Massicard 2007, Dressler
2008, Sökefeld 2008). This ‘revival/transformation’ has manifested itself in the
form of heightened group consciousness, greater ease in expressing identity in the
public sphere, increased public visibility and the making of political and legal
claims based on Alevi identity in social and political arenas (Massicard 2003,
2007, Köse 2010). The debate and the ongoing competition on the core features
and possible leadership and institutional of the modern, urban Alevi identity are
still unsettled.
Positioning Alevi identities
In the case of Alevi identity negotiation, there is no agreement on the ‘nature’
or ‘fundamental features’ of Alevi identity. Those features are constantly negoti-
ated in public and private debates and discussions. As a theoretical and analytical
frame positioning theory will enable us to analyse this debate in a dynamic
and interactive way. Positioning theory is defined as the study of local moral
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580 T. Köse
orders as shifting patterns of mutual and contestable rights and obligations of
speaking and acting (Harré and van Langenhove 1999, Harré and Moghaddam
2003a, Moghaddam et al. 2008). Harré and van Langenhove define position as
a ‘complex cluster of generic personal attributes, structured in various ways,
which impinges on the possibilities of interpersonal, intergroup and even intraper-
sonal action through some assignment of such rights, duties and obligations to
an individual or a group’. By assigning specific rights, duties and obligations,
positioning also restrict and shape the modes of action. As it is described con-
cisely by Benwell and Stokoe, ‘positioning theorists examine the co-construction
of identity between storyteller and audience’ (2006, p. 139). Speakers adopt and
oppose subject positions that were assigned to them in the master narratives and
sometimes propose alternative subject positions through their own discourses and
counter-narratives. Positioning of identities and subject positions is a dynamic and
interactive process.
Positions are relational, in that for one to be positioned as powerful others
must be positioned as powerless (Harré and van Langenhove 1999). Storylines are
written and told from particular positions. This interactive and dialogic (maybe
more complicated) process dynamically shapes relationships in various different
forms. Contingent, flexible and dynamic attributes of positioning provide promis-
ing ways to conceptualise identity. Interpersonal, intergroup or intragroup conflicts
may arise when storylines adopted by different actors are incompatible or in
direct opposition to each other. It is in the constant interplay of mutual recog-
nition of one’s own and the other’s position that the particular version of public
self appropriate to the occasion is constructed (Harré and van Langenhove 1999,
p. 15). Identities have associated norms defining the rights and duties of the sub-
jects. The salience of the self- categorisation and interpretation of rights and duties
are also dependent on social interactions (Moghaddam et al. 2008).
Intergroup positioning is fundamentally achieved through the use of linguistic
devices such as ‘we’, ‘they’, ‘us’, ‘them’, ‘I’ (as a member of a certain group,
‘you’ (as a member of a certain group) and specific group names (Tan and
Moghaddam 1999, p. 183). For understanding meaningful social interactions at
any given episode, positioning theory combines background conditions in terms
of storylines. Social forces, or in Austin’s terms, illocutionary forces, play an
important role in the actualisation of background conditions in any given situa-
tion. In intergroup relations, therefore, the relative positions of groups may change
depending on the situation of storylines and the social forces that are active.
As a methodological framework, positioning theory is based on the
position/act-action/storyline triad, which draws upon the analogy that all of
social life is a manifestation of conversations (Harré and van Langenhove 1999).
Positions within this triangle are defined as the cluster of rights and duties to per-
form certain actions with a certain significance as acts (Harré and Moghaddam
2003, p. 5). Positioning someone or a group of people as benevolent can be
considered to be attributing to those actors a moral superiority in a particular con-
text, and it may also encumber certain duties and responsibilities. In any case,
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Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 581
positions restrict a certain set of actions, whereas it makes others more likely to be
actualised.
Various data sources have been used for this study, but the main data are the
in-depth semi-structured interview transcripts of more than 70 Alevis who were
actively involved (some of them holding key positions) in this process of revival.
In order to protect the anonymity of the informants, I use capital letters.8 Quotes
without capitals are considered to be generic narratives, mentioned by more than
five informants in similar forms. Transcripts and records of semi-academic dis-
cussions also are used to help outline general discussions. The interviews were
conducted in three big cities, Istanbul, Ankara and Malatya, between February
2006 and April 2007. Other data sources such as Alevi journals, websites and some
public events have been analysed in order to collect public narrative accounts. The
informants were contacted based on snowball sampling, while some of the other
interviewees were selected because of their key positions within Alevi associations
and institutions.
Understanding the complexity of Alevi identity
Alevis are envisioned either as an integrated or homogeneous community by
non-Alevis, or the fundamental differences between diverse Alevi understand-
ings are exaggerated in order to deny some of their requests related to group
rights. Within the context of Alevi identity negotiation, the discourses that are
more vocal and publicly visible utilise media resources and mass communica-
tion instruments more successfully than the rest. This success does not necessarily
reflect their intragroup influence or persuasiveness. The general state of confusion
and competition has created splits even within the trans-generational realms of
Alevi households. The editors of the volume Alevilik, which was compiled with
the academic and political discussions from the mail group (tahtacılar), offer an
interesting question representing the confusion of the new generation of Alevis.
My father thinks and says that “Alevilik is essence of Islam, in fact we are the true
Muslims.” I believe that Alevilik is a separate belief system, which has been influ-
enced by Islam. My son says and believes that Alevilik is a philosophy and a way of
life. What should we do now? (Engin and Engin 2004, p. 10)
The question ‘what should we do now?’ is a relevant one for many Alevi fam-
ilies. Each generation within this family adopted a definition and understanding
of Alevi identity according to their specific identity needs, and according to what
they want to do with their identity. Alevi places of worship and ritual performance
‘cemevis’ also have different functions and meaning for different positions. For
some, cemevis should be primarily places of worship, and for others, cemevis
should function as community centres. There are also some people who consider
cemevis as archaic institutions that need to be reformed. Each people adopt a
definition and normative content according to their own needs and vision of life.
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582 T. Köse
Competing discourse positions on the contemporary urban Alevi identity can
be classified under various categories,9 but two of those discourses are currently
more vocal at the public conversations. Ideological Position (IP) and Religious
Position are not strictly separated from each other. There are more overlapping
dimensions than contradicting dimensions; however, they have different interpre-
tations of Alevi history and moral system, different visions about the future of the
Alevi community as well as different perspectives in relation to how to engage
with the ‘other’ and how to get institutionalised.
I see the Alevi creed as a way of life. (AA, journalist)
At the moment, I regard the Alevi creed as a sect [Madhhab]. The Alevi creed is a
way of believing. (HS¸, anthropologist)
Islam also included the Alevi creed, but Islam’s rules are clear, its practices too,
we don’t have any common ground left with Islam. (AE, president of an Alevi
foundation)
The Alevi creed is an ethnic identity. Even if you were a Christian, they would call
you a Christian Alevi. (DK, graduate student)
The four excerpts above, which were collected during the field research from
four different Alevi citizens, represent distinctive perspectives regarding what the
Alevilik is about and how those people relate themselves to their imagined notion
of ‘Aleviness’. In fact, the list is abridged and can be expanded with additional
references and quotations.
Bilici10 (1998), Ocak11 (1996) and Erman and Göker12 (2000) employ dif-
ferent taxonomies to grasp the complexity of contemporary Alevi phenomena.
There are taxonomies that classify Alevilik according to institutions such as Alevi
Bektas¸i Federasyonu (ABF), CEM Vakfı, Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneg˘i and
Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı. The people that position Alevi identity in religious terms assign
different rights and responsibilities to Alevi identity than the ones who position
Alevi identity in political terms. The debates and controversies in the current con-
text are related primarily to the future as well as to the past of Alevi identity and
community.
Alternative discourse positions are substantiated primarily with interviews on
the life stories of Alevi citizens. This is the first study that examines the dynamic
and pragmatic interaction of personal narratives/individual voice and the rich
repertoire of collective storylines in the Alevi case. This dynamic interaction is
crucial for understanding how Alevi individuals and Alevi communities discuss
their boundaries among each other and vis-a-vis the other groups.
Besides the controversial themes related to the definition of ‘self and other’,
‘important historical episodes’ and the fundamental problems of the Alevi com-
munity, the narratives about Alevi identity are used to negotiate these significant
unresolved internal controversies:
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Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 583
(1) Debate on leadership of the community
(2) How ‘other’ is defined and how to engage with it
(3) The historical origins and cultural resources of Alevi tradition.
There are irreconcilable arguments related to these mentioned themes, which leads
to the diversification of the discourses on Alevi identity. Those positions are
substantiated with rich repertoire of personal and collective narratives.
The Religious Position
Alevilik is the essence of Islam which has not been distorted by the Umayyad
understanding and tradition. (Generic Narrative13/GN)
The Religious Position (RP) constructs an ethno-sectarian identity by defining
Alevilik as the Turkish interpretation of Islam as opposed to ‘Umayyad-
contaminated Sunni Islam’. RP assumes that Alevi understanding of Islam is more
‘Islamic’ and ‘authentic’ than the Sunni interpretation of Islam. There is an attri-
bution of double authenticity and legitimacy in the RP in terms of the origins of
Alevi thought and lifestyle. First, because it is perceived to have come directly
from the practices of Ehl-i beyt (the Prophet’s family/lineage). The Ehl-i beyt is
considered to be the second important source of Islam for Alevis, after the Quran.
Second, it is also presented as a tradition of belief that is blended with the pas-
toral Turkoman tribes’ simple, genuine and ‘unpoliticised’ understanding of Islam.
In other words, the Alevi version of Islam is considered to be both ‘more Islamic’
and ‘more Turkish’ than its Sunni alternative.
As is demonstrated in Table 1, Alevi belief system is positioned as ‘essence of
Islam’, ‘Turkish version of Islam’ and ‘authentic, progressive and more modern’
Islam. Some of those positions contradict, yet the moral superiority is attributed to
the ‘authenticity’ and ‘purity’ of the Alevi tradition as a version of Islam. On the
other hand, Sunni or other interpretations of Islam are positioned as ‘Wahhabi’,
‘fundamentalist’, ‘retrograde’ and ‘Umayyad Islam’.
The essence of Islam
The Alevi creed is not a sect [Madh’hab]. The Alevi creed is the essence of Islam.
The Alevi creed is way of understanding Islam in view of its own [values] and
sources. It is not a culture either. (AYK, retired bank manager)
The main problem for the RP is that the Sunni understanding of Islam in Turkey
marginalises Alevis, their cultural practices, rituals and lifestyle. This marginali-
sation is even considered to have been an ongoing practice since the early years
of Islam. Alevis consider the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet I˙s¸leri
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584 T. Köse
Table 1. Features of Religious Position.
Positions Storylines Action
Positioning ‘self’
Better
understanding of
Islam
Essence of Islam
Turkish version of Islam
Authentic Islam
Progressive Islam
Modern world view
We are better and more
authentic Muslims than
Sunnis
Sunni Islam represents
oppressive side of
religious orthodoxy
Conservative Sunnis
(S¸eriatçı) misrepresent
Islam
Socialist struggle was a mistake
deviation from Alevi values, it
was a disaster
Traditional institutions
(cemevis, dedes, dergahs,
foundations) need to be
revived
Atatürk and republican
reforms liberated us from
religious bigotry and
oppression we need to
embrace and defend
republican ethos
We need to struggle with
the challenges of
marginalisation and
discrimination
Positioning ‘other’
Sunni, religious
orthodoxy
Umayyad Islam
Wahhabism
Islamic fundamentalism
Retrograde (gerici) world
view
We pursue social democratic
egalitarian world view
Secularism is our common ground
with Sunnis social and political
order should be secular
Bas¸kanlıg˘ı or simply Diyanet)14 to be the culprit of this marginalisation. The
motive for the marginalisation, according to the RP, is the unwillingness of the
established religious orthodoxies to give equal share in the distribution of material
resources and social and political influence.
Turkey needs to make a choice about whether to keep insisting on the homogeneous
“Sunni” definition of Islam or to recognize and embrace other versions as equal
partners in the making of the modern Turkish national identity. Turkish officials,
bureaucrats, politicians don’t want to share anything with us. They are unwilling
give our share, our rights from the Ministry’s budget. They continue the Umayyad
traits. (KG, lawyer)
The Alevi revival in the RP is regarded as a return to the authentic culture, practices
and rituals of ‘Turkish Islam’. According to the RP, the Turks’ understanding
of Islam was Sunnified, politicised and contaminated during the Seljukid period,
Ottoman times and the multi-party period of Republican Turkey, starting from the
early 1950s and continuing after the 1980 military coup. The politicisation of both
the Alevi creed and Sunni Islam is severely criticised by Alevi groups. RP also
challenges IP for politicizing the Alevi tradition.
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The politicisation of the Alevi creed
The ones who insulted the Alevi creed in the gravest way were those who used the
Alevi creed for their own political agendas. Muawiya cannot be side by side with
Ali. One is a political [figure], the other a man of faith. (AR, dede)
The RD describes Alevilik as the Turkish interpretation/understanding of Islam.
It is claimed that Alevilik is the essence of Islam as opposed to the Arabic and
Persian interpretations that are depicted as Sunni and Shiite Islam. There is the
belief that the Umayyad family distorted the essence of Islam and that Sunni Islam
follows the path of the Umayyads. There is a strong emphasis on common Islamic
values such as love for the Ehl-i beyt (Prophet’s family/lineage).
The Umayyad family introduced political controversies to the religion and they
corrupted the Prophet’s path and fought against the Prophet’s family (Ehl-i beyt).
Sunni Islam is the Arabic and Umayyad understanding of Islam; The Shiite version
of Islam is the Persian understanding of Islam. Alevi Islam, which is the Turkish
understanding of Islam, is definitely a way that fits Turkish society better. (CA, dede)
Furthermore, recently it has acquired a patriotic blend. This is a paradoxical situ-
ation because, on the one hand, this discourse emphasises the universal value and
validity of the Alevi belief system and its potential as a liberation ideology that can
contribute to the peace and prosperity of all humanity, while, on the other hand, it
praises the authenticity and locality of the Alevilik for the nationalist and secularist
Turkish regime. In this discourse, Alevilik is presented as a form of Anatolian folk
Islam, the Turkish people’s grassroots level (low Islam) interpretation of Islam,
as opposed to the Ottoman or Turkish state’s top-down imposed version of ‘high
Islam’.15 In addition, it does not have any religious-oriented political claims in the
public realm. The RP has a blend of local cultural emphasis and emphasises the
importance of traditional ritual practices and traditional sources of Alevi identity.
Alevi institutions, rituals and practices are essential. We have to revive those rituals
and practices and Cemevis are the right places to revive these. We have to return to
the authentic sources and the ritual practices of Alevilik within the urban context.
(HM, president of an Alevi foundation)
The RP tries to keep an open conditional space for dialogue with the other groups
and the people and institutions that represent the official point of view. Some Alevi
groups have criticised the RP for endorsing the ‘Turkish–Islamic Synthesis’ (Türk
I˙slam Sentezi) theory, which implies a nationalist understanding of Alevi culture
and identity. The memory of extreme nationalism (especially the events of the
1970s) has had a negative impact on the Alevi community, which explains why
the nationalist elements of the discourses have been criticised severely. Being in
alliance with the nationalists and followers of the Turkish–Islamic Synthesis, and
trying to move from the periphery to the centre, represents a deviation from the
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586 T. Köse
left-wing position of the Alevis in the social struggle. Indeed, almost no Alevi has
sympathy for such a position.
Involvement in the Marxist and Left-wing struggle was the worst thing that has hap-
pened to Alevis since Yavuz’s Kızılbas¸ massacres in the 16th century. In this case
we almost committed suicide. Fortunately, we survived the period, but it left deep
and permanent damage and destruction in the Alevi community. Our dedes were
insulted by our youth and some of our children became atheists or materialists and
they started to fight against our traditional values. (RK, writer)
Although the overall political language of the RP is close to the secular social
democratic understanding, they are against the extreme left ideologies and activists
because of the negative memories of the pre-1980 situation. The Alevis often are
perceived as the ‘natural allies of the secularist/Kemalist regime’. This general
perception is disturbing for the RP, as it locates the Alevis against other more
conservative Sunnis and groups that have problems with the regime, and at the
same time this does not totally reflect the reality. Atatürk, the father of the mod-
ern Turkish Republic, is considered to be one of the fundamental heroes of the
Alevi community, and the early republican era is tightly embraced in the RP. There
is full-scale appreciation for Atatürk, but there are hesitations about the regime,
especially about the right-wing governments.
The Alevi have never come out victorious. The Alevis have only come out victorious
once. We won one time with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whom we call the last Jelali
[reference to a 16th-century rebel movement]. Atatürk saved us from the sultanate,
religious bigotry, and economic and political oppression. It is all but natural that
Alevis would harbour warm feelings towards such a figure. (MK, vice president of
an Alevi foundation)
One of the most important features of this discourse is that it communicates better
with urban working-class Alevis and educated Alevis that appreciate the ritual and
cultural aspects of their tradition. Besides their traditional legitimacy, dedes know
the oral culture of the Alevi community, which is why they communicate better
with working-class and lower middle-class Alevis.
We never really lived [in accordance with] our faith, we never showed our children.
The community has lost touch with the tradition. This organizing effort came like a
flood, if you will allow the expression. Alevi folks around this neighbourhood and
elsewhere are getting more attached to their belief and their community. (FG, lawyer)
Marxist and political discourse are foreign languages to the average Alevi citizen;
therefore, they are not attracted by this discourse. Narratives such as that of the
Karbala Disaster, the Martyrdom of Hüseyin, the atrocities of the Ottoman era and
the heroic genre of narratives are popular in the Religious Position.
The institutionalisation of the RP is shaped along with the dergahs (dervish
lodges) and cemevis. Dedes are the leaders, social and religious authorities and
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they have legitimacy because of their spiritual and social leadership. In addition,
they are trained to perform some of the basic religious needs of the Alevi com-
munity. At the level of political and social activism, the ideological voice maybe
heard more, but the religious voice is more dominant on the popular level and has
more potential in terms of social mobilisation. According to the RP, the ‘other’ of
Alevilik is not Sunnis in general, but ultra-orthodox Sunnis (s¸eriatçı), Wahhabis,
Islamists and the ‘derin devlet’ (deep or secret state, some paralegal groups within
the civil and the military bureaucracy). Overall, the RP idealises a normative
frame that embraces the elements of religion, tradition and secular nationalism
and provides a cultural sense of belonging to urban Alevis from a wide variety of
backgrounds. RP also challenges the vision that tries to organise Alevi movement
along political or ideological lines.
The Ideological Position
Resistance to state/political authorities that try to marginalize and oppress Alevis
with religious and political arguments and struggling for social justice when the
political systems deny us is an essential feature of the Alevi identity. (KG, lawyer)
For the Ideological Position (IP), it is not relevant to concentrate on the discus-
sion of whether the Alevis are within or outside the definition of Islam, or whether
Alevilik is a better or different interpretation of Islam than Sunni Islam. The refer-
ence points are the social, political and economic orientations of the Alevis, who
are seen as being fundamentally different from the Sunnis, or other identity groups
in Turkey. There is the perception that the contemporary Alevi identity movement
is a social and political movement that is seeking equal treatment under the rule of
law. There is an overall belief that the relationships of Alevis to the Turkish state
and the rest of Turkish society should be based on a secular, democratic, egalitarian
value system and the rule of law.
We may or may not have common ethnic, religious, national or sectarian ties with
other groups in Turkey. Those commonalities do not help to address the problems
of our community. I think we should rather focus on our legitimate equal citizenship
rights, the “real” rule of law and religious liberties. That is what other groups are
trying to do. (AK, vice president of an Alevi foundation)
The IP constructs a politicised identity through dialectic political language. The
relationship between the Alevi community and the other social and political groups
in Turkey has been sustained via constant emphasis on the prevailing differences.
Social and political struggle is an important theme in the narratives of IP.
The Alevi creed is a philosophically oppositional lifestyle and faith. I think that the
Alevis were not assimilated in either the Ottoman [or] Republican periods because
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of this. Alevis, who have not been assimilated throughout a thousand years, are today
being assimilated at the hands of the Alevis [themselves]. It would be grave mistake
if the Alevi creed is reduced just to a belief system. (AL, lawyer/ writer)
In many instances, these differences were essentialised through the use of conflict-
ual storylines about all aspects of the boundary-making procedures. Alevilik was
characterised as having a different worldview. This is an abstract and vague self-
definition that has practical references to an ideological notion of Alevilik. This
understanding is criticised by the RP for being a reductionist use of ‘Alevilik’
for political objectives that is stripped from its cultural and historical context and
background. Overall, IP positions Alevi identity as peripheral, victimised, minor-
ity, marginalised, exploited and heterodox religion, thus accusing the bureaucratic
establishment, Sunni ulama and majority, and the centre-right and Islamist politi-
cians as the culprits of this victimisation and marginalisation (Table 2). IP assumes
a historical continuity in their marginalised and oppressed situation and there is an
assumed continuity in the locus of responsibility.
Alevilik is defined as a world view with its own culture, belief system, rituals,
political rights and different historical experiences. There is even a perspective
among the IP that defines Alevilik as a different religion.
Table 2. Features of Ideological Position.
Positions Storylines Action
Positioning ‘self’ Islam is one of the many
sources of Alevi identity,
it is not the common ground
for us with Sunni groups
Civil society organisations,
associations, foundations,
publication houses, TV
stations and all other
instruments of social
movement need to be
emphasised for struggle
for group rights
Periphery
There might have been
Alevilik without Islam
Resistance to political,
social, religious and
economic orthodoxies
Victim
Our struggle predates
Marxism, there is an overlap
in the objectives of Marxism
and Alevilik that’s why we
were attracted to it
Egalitarian, libertarian and
disobedient to unjust
political and economic
orders are essential
elements of Alevi identity
Minority
Secular democratic values and
rule of law can be the only
common ground with the
Sunnis
We need to struggle with
the challenges of
marginalisation and
discrimination
Oppressed
One can be Alevi without being
a Muslim because Alevilik is
more of an attitude philosophy
Heterodox
Marginalised
Syncretistic religion
Resistance movement
Positioning ‘other’
Oppressors
Political centre
State
Ulema/religious
orthodoxy
Kemalist
bureaucratic
establishment
Islamist
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There exists a whole series of differences [between the Alevis and Sunnis] in under-
standing, from the way of looking at God to being determinative in your daily
relations, to being authoritarian, to determining everything in the light of your faith.
There are also differences in the parts of worship. (FG, lawyer)
The view that defines Alevilik as a separate religion is marginalised both within the
IP as well as within the broader Alevi discourse. The distanced position against the
‘political centre’ established religious orthodoxies and the tradition of resistance
is seen as an essential feature of Alevi identity, according to IP. The storylines
that consider the Kızılbas¸ uprisings during the Ottoman times and the messianic
revolts during the Seljukid era related to the social and economic discontent of the
Anatolian people are emphasised in the IP.
In Anatolia alone there have been about 400 uprisings. In the Seljuk and Ottoman
periods, and of these about 300, I am not giving you any certain numbers, maybe it
was even more . . . The basic cause of these uprisings was hunger and deprivations.
The land was taken away from the citizen or a third was taken of that what he has
produced. (AK, publisher)
A dialectical way of interpreting Alevi history is predominant in IP. The para-
doxical situation is that even though there are limited references to the religious
dimensions of Alevilik, in the IP some people argue that Ali and Ehl-i beyt were
oppressed, as well as many of the family members because they resisted the
unjust rule of the Umayyad order that tried to corrupt the teachings of the prophet
Mohammed. In IP, the theme of continuity is the notion of resistance, rather than
the essence of the belief.
The rise of the IP
The Alevi dernek (association) and vakıfs (foundation) were initially established in
the late 1960s. These associations had been founded with misleading names such
as Hacı Bektas¸ Turizm ve Tanıtma Derneg˘i (Hacı Bektas¸ Tourism and Publicity
Association) or Hacı Bektas¸ Kalkınma ve Yardımlas¸ma Derneg˘i (Hacı Bektas¸
Development and Solidarity Association) or they were established as hems¸ehri
(fellow townsman) associations. There were, however, very few associations that
were founded mainly for the Alevi cause until the early 1990s. Before this, it was
illegal to set up associations in the name of a sect, ethnic or religious group (Kaleli
2000). After a legal battle, the Alevis managed to succeed in their struggle to open
associations with the Alevi name. The 1993 Sivas Events and the 1995 Gazi Riots
accelerated the institutionalisation of these associations and foundations. The pro-
cess of rapid institutionalisation after the Sivas Events of 1993 was reactionary
and defensive in nature. The activists of Alevi background, who had experienced
the left-wing struggle mobilised their organisational experiences in the service of
Alevi identity struggle.
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. . . people inside yesterday’s leftist movements, people who know how to get orga-
nized, they started to re-organize the Alevi movement in a completely new way by
means of foundations or associations in cities. Because they knew what an organiza-
tion was about, they were aware of how to set up, of how to manage [a foundation]
and in a way, they gave the Alevi creed a new breath of life. In this way, the Alevis
owe the leftist, the revolutionary youth, a debt. (AL, lawyer/writer)
The problem relating to this rapid transformation was that some of those activists
tried to articulate their views on Alevi tradition through an ideological language.
This ideological language did not have a resonance with some ordinary Alevi
citizens’ world views and life practices.
I was a revolutionary socialist kind of man before 12 September 1980 [military
coup]. I am still like that. I am a person who has accepted and come to terms with
the struggle I’ve been through in those years. When talking about the revolutionary
movement, when certain demands on a societal level were refused then such demands
as human rights, democracy, equality, justice become society’s [main] concern. (AB,
head of an Alevi association)
Now I do not feel any discomfort in saying that I am an Alevi, but I also have an
upper-identity . . . My upper-identity is communist . . . The task of a communist to
be respectful to sub-identities, to understand sub-identities, to be concerned about
the problems sub-identities face. (AK, publisher)
Rather than completely redefining their identity, they redefined Alevilik in such
a way that would go together with their previous identities and political affili-
ations. These activists created a new political discourse, which was a blend of
the theoretical resources of the dialectical materialism, Marxism, the historical
and political sources of the Anatolian revolts, the practical instrument of iden-
tity politics as well as social movement approaches and resistance methods. Their
interpretation of the Alevi sources and theology is influenced by dialectic Marxist
discourses. It is common to encounter people from the political and intellec-
tual elite that define Alevilik as outside the domain of Islam or Alevilik without
‘Ali’.
Political arguments and language, and legal instruments are dominant in their
mode of interaction with the state and other official institutions. The Ideological
Position is also more reactionary towards the majority Sunni population as they
are perceived as having hostile feelings about Alevis. Some of the legal concepts
they have been using in their appeal to the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR)16 are related to the minority rights framework. Attorneys and writers who
were previously active in the leftist-Marxist struggle are able to practice the lan-
guage of political and legal struggle more skilfully; therefore, they have activated
their comparative advantage for a new cause within the changing political context.
The language of previous activism has been translated into the new Alevi cause in
different forms.
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Alevilik as social and political activism
The social and political activism dimensions of Alevilik are accentuated in com-
parison to the belief dimension. Alevi heroes such as Hacı Bektas¸ Veli, Pir Sultan
Abdal, S¸eyh Bedrettin, Anatolian Dervishes, Shah Ismail and the famous Alevi
poets are presented as the champions of this activism in the IP. There are references
to the ethical teachings of these important figures, but the Islamic dimension and
teachings have been overlooked. The sources of this branch of ethics have been
attributed to a transcendental, humanist value system, which is associated with
pre-Islamic Anatolian-/Turkish-originated values. It is common to hear, ‘Islam is
just a flavour in this transcendental blend of values in the Alevi worldview. Alevilik
might have existed even if the Turcoman tribes were not introduced to Islam’ (AE,
president of an Alevi foundation).
There is also a widely shared notion within the IP that assumes that Islam was
not a natural tendency of the nomadic Turks, and that the Turcomans were forced
to convert to Islam by Arabs between the ninth and thirteenth centuries. Their way
of dealing with Islam is by presenting it as a deviation and imposition that has not
been internalised by the Turcomans.
For the IP, the disruption of promising relations started earlier, even during
Atatürk’s presidency. ‘When the regime started to consolidate its power, it turned
into an oppressive structure imposing its own understanding of a homogeneous
Turkish nation (UO, publisher)’. The IP is also critical with regard to the com-
mon myth that assumes that Alevis have always had a good relationship with the
Kemalist regime, and that the Alevi community is the guarantor/insurance of the
regime’s secularist principles. The subject of Atatürk is an important taboo: he is
like a messianic figure in the RP. He is also highly regarded as an important hero in
Alevi culture. The IP, however, is more critical in its evaluation of Atatürk. While
the RP tends to blame the right-wing politicians for the problems of the regime,
the IP makes more fundamental criticism of the regime as well as of Atatürk.
Bektashi lodges were shut down during Atatürk’s time; indeed the Bektashi Baba’s
were the biggest supporters of Atatürk during the period of national struggle. The
Dersim operation is also planned while Atatürk was still alive. How can you argue
that Kemalism favoured us? (AN, academic)
The influences of dialectic Marxism and dialectic discourses about the self and
other are dominant in IP. There seems to be a very limited space for a dialogic
encounter with the ‘Sunni other’ when you talk to an Alevi that prefers the lan-
guage of the IP. The IP claims that if the Alevis stop the struggle, their authenticity
and differences will disappear and they will be assimilated into the majority Sunni-
Turkish population. The use of ‘Human Rights discourse’ is instrumental in the
overall Alevi struggle for recognition. Some Alevi leaders are also critical of the
instrumental use of Human Rights discourse, which would end up ‘distorting’
Alevi ethos with some other sources.
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For instance, what can we hope from those who define the Alevi creed in terms of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights? This came up in Turkey during the 1960s,
when it was claimed that [the Alevi creed] contained [elements of] Marxism and
after the fall of Marxism what was left was the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the old Marxists could [very well] defend this position without having
to preserve Marxism, but this is an attitude which sees the Alevi creed as social or
political. (RK, writer)
Cemevi for IP is instrumentally defined as a cultural and political space for the
aggregation and expression of economic and political interests. There is a tendency
to see cemevis as functional spaces and a distinctive cultural feature that helps to
shape Alevi identity. They argue that cemevis should not turn into just a space for
worshiping. This, they believe, is contrary to the Alevi world view. The attitude
towards traditional Alevi institutions has been transformed into a more positive
one; however, here is still a feeling that says, ‘we should not insist on some of the
rituals and practices that may seem archaic within the modern urban context’ (I˙M,
lawyer/businessman).
The IP is more popular among emerging, non-traditional Alevi elites, lawyers,
and politicians and educated professional with secular lifestyles, people who are
more integrated with urban life and the Kurdish/Zaza Alevis. Unlike the dergahs
and cemevis in Istanbul, these associations and foundations do not attract ordinary
citizens who have no social and political agenda. The IP and associations were
more active and popular in the late 1990s, but have been losing ground against
the RP and traditional Alevi institutions since then. The belief dimension is still
one of the most significant elements of the Alevi community and purely political
discourses are either losing ground or transforming themselves incorporating the
elements of cultural dimensions more.
Conclusion
The negotiation of collective identities is a complicated process that involves the
negotiation of the past, present and future; group histories; heroes and villains of
the group, normative boundaries and the ways to relate to other communities. The
main difference between these sometimes competing and sometimes complimen-
tary positions on Alevi identity is that they have different practices and parameters
of boundary making and ingroup/outgroup definitions as well as interpretations of
history and visions for the future. For the RP, cultural practices, traditional Alevi
rituals and an ‘un-orthodox’ understanding of Islam are the main parameters of
boundary making. Beliefs, rituals, moral values and communal rapport are essen-
tial elements of the RP. In terms of group definition, the RP represents a religiously
oriented ‘communal group’ approach. The belief dimension of the Alevi tradition
and the ritual performances are crucial for the RP.
The IP has more of a political and ideological mode of boundary making. The
concepts and implications of the arguments are highly politicised. The IP acknowl-
edges that being in the left and taking part in the social and political struggle
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against oppressive structures is an essential feature of Alevilik. Boundaries have
been drawn over the themes of social and political contentions with the state estab-
lishment, and the other groups, mainly conservative Sunnis in Turkey, and to a
certain extent ‘capitalism’ and ‘imperialism’. The Alevi community’s experiences
of direct violence in the 1970s and 1990s and the impact of socialist ideology
were influential on the dialectical position of the IP on political issues. There is
often a political gist even in personal stories. In the case of RP, differences in the
interpretation of Islam with the majority Sunni understanding was balanced with
their commitment to secular republican values, thus creating a common ground
with secular Sunni’s. Whereas in IP, there is a more limited common ground with
the Sunni ‘other’ since oppositional ethos is considered as the essence of Alevi
identity.
The way Alevis tell their personal stories, their storylines about the ‘identity
group (us)’ and the ‘other’ is not just a descriptive enterprise. Those storylines
have significant pragmatic function for calling actors for certain kinds of actions as
shown in Tables 1 and 2. Those actions and institutional activities and discourses
also reproduce and strengthen the positions, which they are related to. At this
point, there is no one ‘hegemonic position’, or a discourse that would convince
all segments of the Alevi community. Alevi identity will rather continue to be a
hybrid identity17 that incorporates the elements of multiple positions including the
ones that are not mentioned in this study. Alevi citizens will not abandon their
pre-existing ideological, economic and cultural priorities and loyalties for the sake
of creating a homogenous Alevi social identity. This diversity and hybridity will
continue to influence Alevi social and political activism.
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Notes
1. It is impossible to figure out the exact population of Alevi citizens in Turkey because
of the lack of census data based on ethnic and sectarian factors. Estimates range from
5 million to 20 million; exaggerations of the size of the population is also a part of
identity struggle.
2. According to Gurr, communal groups define themselves based on common descent,
shared historical experiences, valued cultural and normative traits and belief systems
(Gurr 2007).
3. Madhhab is a term with multiple meanings defined as ‘a way, course, mode, or man-
ner, of acting or conduct or the like’ and as a term of religion and philosophy. It is also
defined as ‘a doctrine, a tenet, an opinion with regard to a particular case’; in Islamic
law specifically, a technical term often translated as ‘school of law’ (‘Madhhab.’
Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Brill Online, 2012). The first meaning of
madhhab ‘a way, course, mode, or manner of acting or conduct’ is a suitable term to
define Alevi community, which is preferred in this study.
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594 T. Köse
4. Arguments about the population of Alevi citizens are part of identity politics;
therefore, it is best to assume a population somewhere between those two figures.
5. I prefer to use the ideological position rather than political position in this text since
religious discourse also have certain social and political claims over Alevi identity.
6. The Turkish–Islamic Synthesis is a state discourse that was institutionalised after the
1980 coup. The three pillars of the Turkish–Islamic Synthesis are the family, the
mosque and the barracks.
7. I prefer to use the term Alevilik as a broader term that refers to the Alevi community
as well as the broader cultural community, rather than the term ‘Alevism’, which
sound more like a political ideology.
8. Those capital letters are not necessarily the initials of the persons that are interviewed.
9. In the original field research, there were five discourse categories: ‘I˙stanbul,’
‘Ankara,’ ‘Ethnic,’ ‘Bektas¸i’ and ‘Post-Alevi.’ The main debate within the Alevi
identity politics is between the first two discourses; this study focuses on the ‘Istanbul
Discourse’, which I defined as ‘Religious Position’, and ‘Ankara Discourse’, which
is defined as ‘Ideological Position’.
10. Bilici (1998) uses the categories of ‘(i) Left-Alevilik; (ii) Mystical-Islamic Alevilik;
(iii) Centre-Alevilik and (iv) Shii-inclined’.
11. Ocak’s taxonomy (1996) classifies the approaches to Alevilik into four main cate-
gories: ‘(i) Kemalist-humanist, (ii) Sunni-Islamist, (iii) Marxist-liberationist and (iv)
Turkish-nationalist’. Ocak’s categorisation is based on the differences in ideological
positions and world views.
12. Erman and Göker (2000) adopt a similar version of taxonomy: (i) ‘Kurdish Alevi
populists; (ii) Social-Democratic Alevis; (iii) religiously conservative Alevis and (iv)
Alevis emphasizing Turkish patriotism’. The taxonomy of Erman and Göker is also
related to the classification of political ideologies in Turkey.
13. ‘Generic Narrative’ (GN) is defined as a narrative that is mentioned by at least five
informants in similar forms.
14. Turkey needs to make a choice about whether to keep insisting on the homoge-
neous ‘Sunni’ definition of Islam or to recognise and embrace other versions as equal
partners in the making of the modern Turkish national identity.
15. Gellner (1997) defined ‘high Islam’ as a tradition based on unitarianism, scriptural-
ism, individualism and puritanism. High Islam excludes spiritual/sufi and heterodox
interpretation.
16. Two major cases where Alevi citizens resorted to ECHR were on compulsory reli-
gious education (Eylem Zengin vs Turkey) and the required religious designation on
Turkish ID cards (Sinan Is¸ık vs Turkey). Hasan Zengin, an Alevi citizen, alleged that
the compulsory classes in religious culture and ethics were essentially based on the
fundamental rules of Hanafite Islam and that no teaching was given on his own faith,
appealed to the ECHR on his daughter Eylem Zengin’s behalf. The court found Hasan
Zengin’s appeal valid (decision on 9 October 2007). Sinan Is¸ık applied to a court
requesting that his identity card feature the word ‘Alevi’ rather than the word ‘Islam’.
The Court decided on the removal of the religion category on ID cards (2 February
2010).
17. Hybridity is used to describe cultural phenomena that allows for the coexistence
of different lifestyles, behaviours, practices and orientations that result in multiple
identities. Hybridity deconstructs the essentialist and static notions of belonging to a
group (Werbner 1997, Verkuyten 2005).
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